Over the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reinvigorated patentable subjectmatter limitations, issuing four significant decisions after nearly three dormant decades. These decisions reflect justifiable concerns about the patenting of abstract business methods and laws of nature. Just as importantly, they reveal internal inconsistencies and confusion about the scope of patentable subject matter and tension with the centuries-old fabric of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. As Justice Breyer remarked at the oral argument in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l (2014), the Mayo (2012) decision did no more than "sketch an outer shell of the content" of the patent-eligibility test, leaving much of the substance to be developed by the patent bar in conjunction with the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom uncritically accepts an expansive reading of Mayo that conflicts with insights from Myriad and Alice, thereby jeopardizing patent protection for diagnostic testing and other vital fields of biomedical research and possibly others. This amicus brief urges the Federal Circuit to grant en banc review in Ariosa v. Sequenom to ventilate critical issues left unanswered by the Supreme Court's patenteligibility decisions. Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patent-eligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an "inventive concept": non-preemptive application; and non-generic application -that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it. While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, we believe that the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates unconventional or inventive application.
1.
No party's counsel took any part in authoring this brief.
2.
No party or party's counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.
3.
No person, other than amici, contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. Since 1998, he has organized more than 50 judicial education programs in conjunction with the Federal Judicial Center, circuit courts, and district courts on intellectual property law and is co-author of a widely used treatise on patent case management. Alice made clear that a generic instruction to "apply it on a computer" could not It remains to be seen whether patent protection is the most appropriate regime for promoting this area of bioscience research. But given Congress's reluctance to take on these critical questions and the Supreme Court's less than lucid articulation of standards, the Federal Circuit has an especially important role in ensuring that this controversy receives thorough evaluation. At a minimum, such an effort would assist Congress, the Supreme Court, and the public in better understanding the issues. Failure to review this case en banc risks cementing a speculative interpretation of applicable law.
II. Mayo Does Not Condition Patent-Eligibility on Unconventional Application.
In setting forth the applicable legal standard, the panel opinion states that, for claims encompassing natural phenomena, "the process steps are the additional features that must be new and useful." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Because the preparation of plasma and serum from blood was routine and conventional as of the filing date, as were general techniques for the amplification of DNA, id. at 1377-78, the panel opinion concluded that none of the claims in suit is patent-eligible under Mayo.
However, Mayo does not require that a new discovery be applied by unconventional means. Although some language in Mayo could be interpreted to set forth unconventional or inventive application as a possible test for patenteligibility, Mayo suggests two other possibilities for an "inventive concept": nonpreemptive application; and non-generic application -that is, more than a statement of a natural law coupled with an instruction to apply it. 3 While the panel was correct to perceive that Mayo describes preemption as the underlying justification for the patent-eligibility doctrine, not the operative test, the panel was incorrect to conclude that Mayo dictates a test of unconventional application.
A requirement for unconventional application is also inconsistent with the Court's post-Mayo opinions. In Myriad, the Court ruled that cDNA, which is simply a synthetic DNA copy of a naturally occurring mRNA molecule, is patenteligible. There was no pretense in the case that the act of reverse-transcribing natural mRNA into cDNA was inventive, and indeed the production of cDNA was known, routine, and conventional when the Myriad patents were filed in 1994. 4 Had the Court required unconventional application over the natural phenomenon of mRNA, the Court could not have sustained the eligibility of the cDNA claims.
While Alice noted that the implementation of the claims in suit was "routine" and "conventional," the focus of the Court's analysis was whether the claim was to a generic application. 5 Unlike Mayo, the word "obvious" was conspicuously absent from Alice. The question, for the Court, was "whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359.
Alice clarified that the § 101 inquiry asks not whether a claim represents an unconventional application of a fundamental principle, but whether a claim does more than state a fundamental principle, plus a generic instruction to "apply it."
The Mayo claims, which recited only the diagnostic correlation, clearly failed that standard: they did nothing but reveal the underlying natural relationship.
But at least some of the claims in this case, which claim not cffDNA but the use of cffDNA as a means for diagnosing a genetic condition of the fetus, do more than simply claim the natural phenomenon of cffDNA. They might therefore satisfy
Mayo and Alice's standard of non-generic application.
In light of Myriad and Alice, the Court's interest in unconventional activity is best understood as a sufficient condition for patent-eligibility: claims are patenteligible if they implement a fundamental principle by unconventional means. The
Court in Mayo and Alice therefore scrutinized the claims for unconventional steps that would definitively confer patent-eligibility, and found none. But the panel opinion here goes well beyond that test by elevating unconventional activity to a sufficient and necessary condition for patent-eligibility: claims are patent-eligible if and only if they implement a fundamental principle by unconventional means.
Given the potentially dire consequences of such an interpretation for biomedical research, the en banc court should reject that interpretation of Mayo.
III. Mayo and Alice Prohibit Dissection of Claims into Old and New Components.
Under the panel opinion's analysis, the § 101 inquiry requires process claims to be dissected into the underlying discovery and the steps by which that discovery is applied -and denies patent-eligibility if the individual steps were previously known in the art. 
V.

Conclusion.
This case presents critical issues for patent-eligibility jurisprudence, justifying granting the petition for rehearing en banc.
